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While some scholars argue that ￿scal decentralization gave Chinese local governors strong incentives
to promote local economic growth, traditional ￿scal federalism theories are not directly relevant to
explain such an e⁄ect in the particular context of China. In this paper, we explain the existence of
competition among Chinese local o¢ cials using a model of yardstick competition "from the top." In
this model, the central government (rather than local voters) creates competition among local o¢ cials
by rewarding or punishing them on the basis of relative performance in providing public spending.
Our theoretical framework predicts that, in this context, the central government involves strategic
interactions among local governors. Then, by estimating a spatial lag dynamic model for a panel data
of 29 Chinese provinces from 1980 to 2004, we provide empirical evidence of the existence of such
public spending interactions. We propose a rigorous empirical framework which takes into account
heterogeneity, endogeneity problems and spatial error dependence. The results suggest that there
actually are strategic interactions among Chinese provinces.
JEL Classi￿cation: D72, H7
Keywords: Decentralization, China, public spending interactions, yardstick competition, spatial
panel data.1 Introduction
China￿ s remarkable growth in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with ￿scal decentralization so
that some scholars like Zhuravskaya (2000) argue that the latter gave Chinese local o¢ cials
strong incentives to promote local economic growth, creating a basis for nationwide high
economic performance. This paper proposes an explanation for the existence of such compe-
tition between Chinese local governments by considering a yardstick competition "from the
top," in which the central government creates competition among local governors by judging
them on the basis of relative performance in providing public spending.
Fiscal decentralization has been a critical component of economic reform in China but
"Chinese style decentralization" is actually conceptually di⁄erent from decentralization in
many other countries. First, China￿ s current ￿scal system is largely decentralized while its
governance structure is rather centralized with strong top-down mandates and a uniform
governance structure. According to Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000), it can be described as a
multidivisional-form hierarchy structure in which the central government exerts great in￿ u-
ence on the local administrations￿actions.1 Second, the power of provincial governments is
not based on a system of electoral representation: the governors are appointed by the cen-
tral government in Beijing.2 Lastly, population mobility between provinces still limited in
spite of the relaxations of the Hukou system.3 In traditional ￿scal federalism theory, decen-
tralization is supposed to increase the e¢ ciency of public spending by inducing competition
between local o¢ cials, through a "vote with feet" or a "yardstick competition" created by
local voters. In China, traditional disciplining devices such as local elections and exit option
are not available. Hence, fundamentally, these theories are not relevant in this context.
Following Blanchard and Shleifer (2001), we argue that vertical control can ensure ac-
countability of local governors and induce interjurisdictional competition. Indeed, Tsui
(2005) describes how Chinese provincial leaders operate within a well-de￿ned career structure
1 China￿ s intergovernmental relations are a hierarchical system of bureaucratic control where provincial
governments must accept the uni￿ed leadership of the State Council which has the power to decide on the
division of responsibilities and to annul inappropriate decisions and orders of provincial governments. A
representative of the Communist Party of China is appointed by their supervisors and acts as the policy
maker. The Party Secretary is always in precedence above the leader of the People￿ s Government.
2 We can note that there are elections at village level.
3 The Hukou system is a household registration system which imposes strict limits on Chinese citizens
changing their permanent place of residence.
1inside the political hierarchy. They undergo detailed performance reviews by their superiors,
and are rewarded or penalized according to their success in achieving speci￿c targets. Pro-
motions, demotions, and job-related bene￿ts all depend on such reviews, which have become
increasingly formal.4 Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) actually show that provincial o¢ cials are
more often promoted to the Party￿ s Central Committee if their province￿ s relative growth rate
increases. Similarly, Li and Zhou (2005) examined the careers of top o¢ cials in 28 provinces
from 1979 to 1995 and found that promotions are signi￿cantly more likely in provinces with
higher growth. Local governors may consider the risk of damaging their careers since the
probability of their reappointment depends on how well they perform in ful￿lling their man-
dates from above. So career concerns may create strong incentives to improve local economic
performance, as in democratic countries. The idea that the performance of local governments
can be evaluated by making comparisons between them was previously proposed by Salmon
(1987) and formally developed by Besley and Case (1995). Here we modify the model of
the latter to apply yardstick competition to China. This competition is not "from the bot-
tom" but "from the top" since the principal is the central government, and not the local
voting populations. While Besley and Case (1995) provide a model of political economy of
tax-setting, we focus on public spending choices. Indeed, although provincial autonomy in
managing ￿scal resources is controversial, everybody agrees that they have a lot of freedom
as regards the amount of their extrabudgetary ￿nancing and, hence, to determine the amount
of their public expenditure. In this way, we propose a possible explanation of the existence of
competition among Chinese local governments despite the absence of electoral accountability
and population mobility.
Firstly this paper develops a model of public spending choices in a multijurisdictional
world with asymmetric information, where the central government makes comparisons be-
tween local governors to overcome political agency problems. As in the traditional yardstick
competition model, information spillovers from other jurisdictions a⁄ect the delivery of public
services in a jurisdiction. Thus, when the central government uses neighboring performance
to judge a governor, the latter is encouraged to consider neighboring ￿scal decisions so that
4 Under Mao, promotion in part depended on ideological conformity but as reformers came to dominate in
the 1980s, targets increasingly focused on economics. As of the mid-1990s, the system for evaluating provincial
leaders assigned 60 out of 100 points to targets related to economic performance (Zhang, 2006).
2we should observe strategic interactions among local decision-makers. Moreover, we show
that we should not observe such strategic interactions in a centralized ￿scal system. Secondly
this paper estimates a spatial lag model for a panel data of 29 Chinese provinces from 1980 to
2004 taking into account heterogeneity, endogeneity problems and spatial error dependence
to test the theoretical model￿ s predictions. To our knowledge, this study is the ￿rst attempt
to test public spending interactions in China. Indeed, most of the empirical literature focuses
on strategic interactions with respect to taxes in developed countries. Little attention has
been paid to the public expenditure side,5 especially in developing or emerging countries.6
Our empirical analysis actually provides evidence of the existence of strategic interactions
among Chinese local governments operating in a vertical bureaucratic control system. We
also show that such interactions are reinforced by a higher degree of ￿scal decentralization.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a theoretical model of yardstick
competition "from the top;" Section 3 estimates a spatial lag model for a panel data of 29
Chinese provinces from 1980 to 2004 to test the existence of public spending interactions.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework: Yardstick competition "from the
top"
Besley and Case (1995) introduced yardstick competition between governments as a discipline
device for rent-seeking politicians in the context of a developed and democratic country. This
paper modi￿es the traditional approach by considering a model of yardstick competition
"from the top" and by focusing on public spending choices to apply yardstick competition to
the particular context of China. Moreover, while Besley and Case (1995) focus on the e⁄ect
of yardstick competition on the probability of being reelected, we focus on its e⁄ect on the
5 We can mention the works of Redoano (2007) or Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008). They ￿nd that
some interactions take place among neighboring jurisdictions with respect to expenditures for EU countries
and French municipalities respectively.
6 Akin, Hutchinson, and Strumpf (2005) analyze the decentralization of health care provision in Uganda
and provide evidence for the hypothesis that spillover e⁄ects cause spending on public goods in one district
to reduce spending in neighboring districts. Arze, Martinez-Vasquez, and Puwanti (2008) focus on local
discretionary expenditures in Indonesia and highlight strategic complementarity of local public spending.
Caldeira, Foucault, and Rota-Graziosi (2008) have also found strategic complementarity among local public
spending among Beninese municipalities.
3existence of strategic interactions among local governments.
2.1 The model
Following Besley and Case (1995), we consider a principal/agent model.
1. The agents are local o¢ cials. They are assumed to know more about the short term
economic shocks at local level than do the central government.
2. The principal here is the central government. It is assumed to use performance indi-
cators of neighboring local o¢ cials as a benchmark to appraise whether agents waste
resources and deserve to remain in o¢ ce.
3. The main incentive mechanisms used to discipline governors are reappointment (instead
of elections). The central government decides whether or not to reappoint an agent.
We consider a jurisdiction whose local government provides public services of a given
quality (Gi) ￿nanced by taxes (t). The ￿nal level of ￿scal revenue is t￿k, with ￿k, the
product stochastic and observed only by the local government. ￿k can take three values:
high (H), medium (M) or low (L) with probabilities pH; pM and pL, which are assumed to
be evenly spaced with di⁄erence ￿
t .7
The local governments are potentially of two kinds: it can be "good" (g) with probability
￿ or "bad" (b) with probability (1 ￿ ￿). We assume that ￿ ￿ 1
2.8 Agent￿ s strategies are
denoted by G(￿k;T); with k ￿ (H;M;L) and T ￿ (g;b). Good local governors do not rent-
seeking or waste resources while bad ones do. The latter can subtract 0; ￿ or 2￿ as rent or
waste. Formally, we have:
G(￿k;g) = t￿k; (1)
and
G(￿k;b) = t￿k ￿ ri; (2)
with ri, the rent.
7 Note that three levels of product are necessary to obtain interesting results.
8 This hypothesis will allow us to highlight the discipline e⁄ect of the yardstick competition. Indeed, if
￿ <
1
2; under yardstick competition, bad local governments will never reduce their rent since the central
government won￿ t be willing to reappoint them even if they both reduce their rent (see Section 2.3.2).
4As in Besley and Case (1995), we consider two time periods with a discount factor ￿
satisfying 1
2 < ￿ < 1. The central government observes public spending decisions and reviews
its belief that the agent is good using Bayes￿rule.9 Hence it chooses whether or not to
reappoint him since it wants to maximize public spending for a given level of taxes in period
2. The central government strategy is denoted by
￿(Gi)￿[0;1]; (3)
which corresponds to the probability that it reappoints a local governor who sets a public
spending level Gi: A bad local o¢ cial chooses public spending to maximize his discount
utility which depends positively on the rent in period 1 and on expected rent in period 2:
E [V (Gi j￿k)] = ri + ￿(Gi)￿2￿; (4)
A bad o¢ cial who is reappointed sets no period 2 discipline and takes a rent equal to 2￿.10
So, he contemplates between the rent in period 1 and the expected rent in period 2.11
2.2 The centralized ￿scal system
As a benchmark, we ￿rst consider the case in which the ￿scal system is centralized. All tax
revenues are collected by the central government at local level and transferred back to local
governments according to a spending plan made by the center. It corresponds to the perfect
information case. Formally, we have:
G(Ci;g) = Ci and G(Ci;b) = Ci ￿ ri; (5)
with Gi, the level of public spending, Ci; the ￿scal revenue transferred by the central govern-
ment and ri, the rent. In this case, a local governor who sets a level of public spending lower
9 Note that we can easily consider that the central government has no capacity to make a credible pre-
commitment on transparent rules of career evolution depending on ￿scal performance only. Indeed, promotions
of a close relative of the leaders of the central government are common in China. For instance, recently, Li
Xiaopeng, the son of former Chinese premier Li Peng was promoted to governor of Hunan province.
10 More generally, 2￿ can be considered as a reward to behave as a good governor in period 1 such as a
promotion.
11 Note that it is assumed that there is no sanction, i.e., a local governor is not bound to give back what
he took as a rent in period 1.
5than the ￿scal revenue transferred by the central government will be automatically seen as
a bad local governor and will not be reappointed. Strict dominance arguments rule out any
equilibrium in which G(Ci;b) = Ci (￿ = 0) as long as ￿ < 1: Then, providing Gi = Ci ￿ ￿
gets less rent with no gain in the probability of staying governor so that bad local governors
are not encouraged to reduce their rent and take 2￿:
Lemma 1 Under perfect information a centralized ￿scal system is characterized by:
(i) Good governors set: G(Ci;g) = Ci:
(ii) Bad governors set: G(Ci;b) = Ci ￿ 2￿:
(iii) Central government sets: ￿(Ci ￿ ￿) = ￿(Ci ￿ 2￿) = 0 and ￿(Ci) = 1:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1
In this case, the information about the nature of the local government is revealed. Yard-
stick competition is useless and has no e⁄ect on local o¢ cials￿public spending choices which
are independent of what other agents are doing.
Proposition 1 Under our assumptions, when the ￿scal system is centralized, there
is no horizontal strategic interaction.
2.3 The decentralized ￿scal system
We now consider a decentralized case with asymmetric information between the local o¢ cials
and the central government. The nature selects the type of the local governor and the
product. We deduce ￿ve possible public spending levels, fG1;G2;G3;G4;G5g with G1 >
G2 > G3 > G4 > G5. A good governor always provides public spending consistent with the
true level of tax revenue:
G(￿H;g) = t￿H = G1 and G(￿M;g) = t￿M = G2 and G(￿L;g) = t￿L = G3:
A bad governor can choose to take no rent, a rent of ￿ or 2￿. According to the products,
the level of public spending can be:
G(￿H;b) = t￿H = G1 or (t￿H ￿ ￿) = t￿M = G2 or (t￿H ￿ 2￿) = t￿L = G3;
6G(￿M;b) = t￿M = G2 or (t￿M ￿ ￿) = t:￿L = G3 or (t￿M ￿ 2￿) = G4;
G(￿L;b) = t￿L = G3 or (t￿L ￿ ￿) = (t￿M ￿ 2￿) = G4 or (t￿L ￿ 2￿) = G5:
The following table sums up the possible levels of public spending:
Table 1: Levels of public spending depending on product and rent levels
TypenProduct High Medium Low
Good G1 G2 G3
Bad r = 0 r = ￿ r = 2￿ r = 0 r = ￿ r = 2￿ r = 0 r = ￿ r = 2￿
G1 G2 G3 G2 G3 G4 G3 G4 G5
2.3.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium without yardstick competition
We consider ￿rst one jurisdiction and we ￿nd Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the public
spending game.
With ￿ < 1, strict dominance argument rules out any equilibrium where G(￿H;b) = G1,
G(￿M;b) = G2 and G(￿L;b) = G3. Moreover, the central government will always believe
that a local government who sets G4 or G5 is bad, so that ￿(G4) = ￿(G5) = 0. Hence,
by applying strict dominance rule, a bad governor will always take a maximal rent when
the product is low: G(￿L;b) = G5: Then, if pL > 1=2 a bad governor takes a reduction in
rent when the product is medium (￿M) in order to be reappointed: G(￿M;b) = G3. Indeed,
observing G3, using Bayes￿rule, the central government is willing to reappoint the local
government if pL > 1=2, a high enough value for it to be su¢ ciently likely that a governor
who chooses G3 is actually good. Hence, since ￿ > 1=2, the governor is encouraged to reduce
his rent when the product is medium (￿M) to be reappointed, setting no discipline and a
rent equal to 2￿ in period 2: On the contrary, when the product is high (￿H), it is worse o⁄
playing G2 since it gets less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment so that a
bad governor takes a maximal rent when the product is high: G(￿H;b) = G3:
The following proposition illustrates Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in an interesting and
simple case: pL > 1=2.
Lemma 2 Under asymmetric information, without yardstick competition, if pL >
71=2, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is:
(i) A bad local governor sets:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
G(￿H;b) = t￿H ￿ 2￿ = G3;
G(￿M;b) = t￿M ￿ ￿ = G3;
G(￿L;b) = t￿L ￿ 2￿ = G5:




￿(G1) = ￿(G2) = ￿(G3) = 1;
￿(G4) = ￿(G5) = 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2
Without yardstick competition, a local governor can be encouraged to reduce his rent to
be reappointed. But, local governments￿public spending choices are independent of what
other local o¢ cials are doing.
2.3.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with yardstick competition
We now consider two neighboring jurisdictions with identical environments and shocks in
which appointed o¢ cials may be of di⁄erent types. We analyze the e⁄ect of the central
government￿ s information about public spending in both jurisdictions. Like Besley and Case
(1995), we assume that local o¢ cials know each other￿ s types.12 We keep considering the
case where pL > 1=2 to compare equilibrium with and without yardstick competition. We
note ￿(GijGj) the probability that the central government reappoints a local governor i who
sets a public spending level Gi, observing a level Gj in the neighboring local jurisdiction j
and G(￿H;TijTj) the strategy of the local governor i who knows the type of its neighboring
local government j. We have three cases to consider (see Appendix A.1.3).
First, if both local governments are good, both set public spending equal to t￿k, k ￿
(H;M;L).
12 In other words, we suppose that neighboring local governments know more about each other than the
central government do.
8Second, if both local governments are bad, both local governors choosing the same strat-
egy gives the central government more con￿dence that they are good. In particular, it is
now willing to reappoint a governor if it observes G3 in both jurisdictions if pL > 1 ￿ ￿.
This condition is weaker than the previous one since, by assumption, ￿ ￿ 1=2. Hence, both
bad governors act in the same way and reduce their rent when the product is medium to be
reappointed. It follows that local governors are better able to make the central government
believe that both are good by choosing the same strategy. In this case, yardstick competi-
tion involves a discipline e⁄ect which leads bad governments to increase the level of public
spending in period 1.
Third, we consider the case where one local government is good and the other is bad.
In this case, the bad incumbent will be found out by providing a level of public spending
above his neighbor. Hence, when the product is medium (￿M) playing G3 now results in
being unseat. A bad government can no longer reduce its rent when ￿M to be reappointed:
it takes a maximal rent when ￿M: G(￿M;b) = G4: The good local government in￿ icts an
externality on the bad one, reducing the latter￿ s reappointment chances. In this case, the
yardstick competition separates good governments from bad governments (selection e⁄ect)
but involves a decrease of public spending in period 1.
Lemma 3 Under asymmetric information, with yardstick competition, if pL > 1=2,
the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is:
(i) If both local governments are good, they both set:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
G(￿H;gjg) = t￿H = G1;
G(￿M;gjg) = t￿M = G2;
G(￿L;gjg) = t￿L = G3:
If both local governments are bad, they both set:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
G(￿H;bjb) = t￿H ￿ 2￿ = G3;
G(￿M;bjb) = t￿M ￿ ￿ = G3;
G(￿L;bjb) = t￿L ￿ 2￿ = G5:
9If one local government is good and the other is bad, they set:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
G(￿H;bjg) = t￿H ￿ 2￿ = G3;
G(￿M;bjg) = t￿M ￿ 2￿ = G4;
G(￿L;bjg) = t￿L ￿ 2￿ = G5:
G(￿H;gjb) = t￿H = G1;
G(￿M;gjb) = t￿M = G2;
G(￿L;gjb) = t￿L = G3:




￿(G1) = ￿(G2jG2) = ￿(G3jG3) = 1;
￿(t￿k ￿ ri jt￿k) = ￿(G4) = ￿(G5) = 0;:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3
Our results are similar to those of Besley and Case (1995) and we distinguish the two
e⁄ects of the yardstick competition highlighted by Canegrati (2006): the discipline e⁄ect
and the selection e⁄ect. When both local o¢ cials are bad, choosing the same strategy gives
the central government more con￿dence that governors are good so that bad local o¢ cials
decide, as soon as possible, to both reduce their rent. When one local o¢ cial is good and
another is bad, the bad governor always takes a maximal rent since it has no chance to be
reappointed by reducing its rent. Finally, when the central government makes comparisons
between local jurisdictions, local o¢ cials care about what other local governments are doing
since it a⁄ects its own probability of being reappointed.
Proposition 2 Under our assumptions, the yardstick competition "from the top"
involves horizontal strategic interactions among neighboring local governments.
We can note that there is no common agreement about the ability of the yardstick
competition to reach citizens￿welfare. Economists who believe that government is benevolent
are prone to see intergovernmental competition as a source of negative externalities which
lowers welfare. On the contrary, the public choice perspective which regards governments
as Leviathan sees yardstick competition as potentially bene￿cial for welfare (Besley and
Smart, 2002). Br￿lhart and Jametti (2007) support the view that tax competition can be a
second-best form of welfare enhancement by constraining the scope for public-sector revenue
maximization. They ￿nd evidence of welfare-increasing ￿Leviathan taming￿ . Economic
10theory also provides statements of the conditions under which tax competition may be "a
force for good" or "a force for bad".13 Belle￿ amme and Hindriks (2005) analyze the role of
yardstick competition for improving political decisions and ￿nd a generally neutral result. In
our case, it is straightforward to show that the total level of public spending provided with
tax held ￿xed is higher with yardstick competition: it is lower in period 1 but this e⁄ect is
o⁄set in period 2 since bad local governors are less likely to be reappointed.14
3 Empirical evidence of strategic interactions among Chinese
provincial governments
Our theoretical framework shows that the yardstick competition "from the top" involves
strategic interactions among neighboring local governments (Proposition 2). Hence, ￿rst, we
empirically test the existence of such horizontal strategic interactions in determining public
spending. We do not pretend that strategic interactions always arise through a yardstick
competition only. But, in the Chinese context, such interactions cannot arise through tra-
ditional channels like population mobility or electoral discipline so that we can argue that a
yardstick competition "from the top" should be the principal source of strategic interactions.
Second, according to Proposition 1, when the ￿scal system is centralized, we should not
observe any horizontal strategic interactions. Empirically, we test the e⁄ect of the degree of
centralization on the existence of horizontal strategic interactions. Before that, we provide
an overview of the decentralization process in China and some descriptive statistics.
3.1 Decentralization in China
The basic hypothesis of our analysis is that the Chinese provinces acquired an autonomous
budgetary power which allows them to determine the amount of their spending. One of the
major objectives of the ￿scal reform was to make local governments ￿scally self-su¢ cient
(see Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005) for a detailed overview of the decentralization process
in China.). Provincial governments have been given considerable latitude in shaping local
13 Edwards and Keen (1996), for instance, show that the net welfare e⁄ect of tax competition hinges on the
relative magnitude of two parameters: the marginal excess burden of taxation and the government￿ s marginal
ability to divert tax revenue for its own uses.
14 This is true as soon as ￿ >
1
4.
11policies and managing ￿scal resources: more than 70 percent of the entire public expenditure
was incurred at local levels in 2004 (see Figure 1 in Appendix A.2.1).15
Before 1979, China practiced a "unitarian budgetary system" (tongshou tongzhi). This
￿scal system was characterized by centralized revenue collection and centralized ￿scal trans-
fers. Most taxes and pro￿ts were collected by local governments and were remitted to the
central government, and then in part transferred back to the local governments according
to expenditure needs approved by the center. This system was in accord with the planned
economy. The ￿scal decentralization policy was implemented in 1980. The highly central-
ized system was changed into a revenue-sharing system called "￿scal contracting system"
(caizheng chengbao zhi). Although the central government retained the responsibility for
de￿ning the ￿scal system, the administration and the collection of taxes were widely devolved
to provinces. There were three basic types of revenue under this reformed system: central
revenues that accrue to the center, local revenues that accrue to the local governments, and
shared revenues. Actually, during this period, the local governments controlled the e⁄ective
tax rates and bases by o⁄ering varying degrees of tax concessions to enterprises and shifted
budgetary funds to extrabudgetary funds.16 This period is generally considered as one of
great autonomy for provincial governments. From 1980 to 1993, the central government￿ s
share of total budgetary revenue declined from 51 percent to 28 percent. Hence, the central
government decided in late 1993, to replace this system with a "separating tax system", a
system of allocation of the various categories of taxes between the center and the provinces.
The center and provinces became responsible for the administration and collection of their
own taxes. To a certain extent, the reform may have strengthened the ￿scal autonomy of
provinces. Indeed, local governments￿tax revenue no longer depends on negotiation with the
center, provincial taxes have an important ￿scal potential and the provinces bene￿t from tax
revenues they collect.
Provincial autonomy results in a very di⁄erent ￿scal e⁄ort from one province to another
and in the existence of de￿cits during the execution of the budgets (Bahl, 1999). Moreover,
15 Provincial levels are ￿rst-level local state administrative organs in China. By conventional measure, there
are ￿ve tiers in the China ￿scal system: the central government, 33 province-level regions, 333 prefecture-level
regions, 2,862 county-level regions and 44,741 township-level regions.
16 They thus minimized tax sharing with the central government. Moreover, for most local governments,
there was a strong incentive to conceal their revenue capacities, as the center tended to revise the rules of the
game to penalize local governments with fast-growing revenues.
12although provincial ￿scal autonomy evolution from one reform to another is controversial,
everybody agrees that they have a lot of freedom as regards the amount of their extrabud-
getary spending. In spite of their name, these ￿scal revenues belong to the budget since
provinces plan formally to collect them and to spend them.17 The development of the extra-
budgetary ￿nancing illustrates central government￿ s tolerance of the ￿scal initiatives of local
governments (Zhang, 1999). Hence, local governments are not deprived of their freedom to
determine the amount of their public expenditure.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Our panel dataset covers the period 1980-2004 for 29 provinces. We consider the 22 provinces
or sheng (Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan,
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan,
Yunnan and Zhejiang), the 5 autonomous regions or zizhiqu (Guangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxia,
Xinjiang Uygur, Xizang) and the 4 municipalities or shi (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and
Tianjin).18
Data for provinces￿ public expenditure come from the China Statistical Yearbook for
various years. Public expenditure is divided into ￿ve spending categories: appropriation
for capital construction, expenditure for enterprise innovation, expenditure for supporting
agricultural production, culture, education, science & health care and government adminis-
tration spending. As shown in Figure 2 (see Appendix A.2.1), social expenditure in culture,
education, science and health care represent around 40% of local government expenditure.
Capital expenditure also represents an important (but unstable) share of public spending.
Over the past 30 years, China has transformed itself, posting extraordinary rates of
growth. At the same time, it has become a far less equal nation, with vast di⁄erences
emerging between those living in rural and urban areas or inland and coastal areas. In
particular, incomes in coastal areas have grown faster than in inland provinces, opening a
coastal-inland income gap that has widened continuously. This pattern is not surprising given
17 In 1978, total extra-budgetary revenue was about 10% of the GDP while total budgetary revenue was
about 31%. In 1993, the extra-budgetary revenue was up to 16% of the GDP and the budgetary revenue was
down to 16% of the GDP (Statistical Yearbook of China, 1995).
18 We excluded the Xizang region (Tibet) since data are likely to be overvalued. Moreover, in 1997,
Chongqing separated from Sichuan to become an independent prefecture in its own right but we have no data
for this prefecture before 1997. So, we have combined Chongqing with Sichuan.
13that much of China￿ s recent economic development was led by rapidly expanding exports,
￿nanced to a considerable extent by foreign direct investment. Local governments play an
essential role in providing social services. However, many local governments, especially those
in poor western regions, are providing fewer and lower quality public services. Regarding total
public spending we see that coastal provinces account for 65% of the total local governments￿
expenditure. The distribution of per capita central transfers by province increases these
inequalities: Shanghai, the richest province, is the largest recipient of central transfers per
capita in 2004 (5,079 yuan) while Henan, a relatively poor province, is the smallest one (646
yuan).
Finally, the level of public spending seems to be largely spatially correlated due to spatial
heterogeneity of provinces. Our empirical framework consists of testing the existence of
substantive strategic interaction between Chinese neighboring local governments. We have
to ascertain that the observed spatial auto-correlation can be attributed to a real strategic
interaction process among local authorities and not to exogenous correlation in omitted
provinces characteristics or common shocks to local ￿scal policy.
3.3 Are there public spending interactions among Chinese provinces?
3.3.1 Econometric framework
To test the existence of horizontal strategic interactions, in line with earlier literature, we
consider a speci￿cation in which (the log of) public expenditure in province i in year t, Git,
is a function of (the log of) its neighbors￿public spending, Gjt.19 We allow Git to depend




￿ijGjt + ￿Xit + ￿i + "it; (6)
where i = 1;:::;n denotes a province and t = 1;:::;T a time period, ￿ij, ￿ and ￿i are
unknown parameter vectors and "it a random error. All time-invariant community charac-
teristics, observed or unobserved are represented by ￿i. Since there are too many parameters
19 See, for instance, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008), Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008) or
Redoano (2007).
14￿ij to be estimated, we consider:
Git = ￿Ajt + ￿Xit + ￿i + "it; (7)
where Ajt =
X
wij:Git is the weighted average vector of public spending in the set of
neighbors local governments j at time t.
The ￿rst problem concerns the way the neighbors of a province are de￿ned. An ￿ a priori￿
set of interactions has to be de￿ned. We try to rely on insights derived from our theoretical
model. In the latter, the central government introduces a yardstick competition among
local jurisdictions which are comparable, with identical environments and shocks. A scheme
that assigns weights based on geographical proximity is commonly used in the empirical
literature of interjurisdictional interactions and seems to be particularly relevant in China
where heterogeneity of provinces is widely spatially distributed. Hence we have ￿rst chosen
two geographical de￿nitions of neighboring communities. The ￿rst is based on the Euclidean
distance between provinces, wdist
ij .20 The second, wcont
ij ; is based on a contiguity matrix where
the value one is assigned if two provinces share the same border and zero otherwise. Then,
following Lockwood and Migali (2009), we compare these weights to ￿ placebo￿weights, w
plac
ij ,
which are chosen randomly without regard to any economic considerations.21 This placebo
weighting scheme gives us a useful benchmark to ascertain that the potential observed spatial
auto-correlation can be attributed to a substantive strategic interaction process and not to
some general positive correlation between all public spending generated by omitted common
shocks.22
Following Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008), Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008),
Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Redoano (2007), we introduce the lagged dependent variable,
Git￿1 , as a right hand side in order to take into account persistency in public expenditure:
Git = ￿Git￿1 + ￿Ajt + ￿Xit + ￿i + "it: (8)
20 Weights wij are given by 1=dij where dij is the Euclidian distance between provinces i and j for j 6= i.
21 We generate a random number distributed between 0 and 1 for each province. Then, the value 1 is
assigned if the di⁄erence between random numbers of two provinces is higher than 0.5 and 0 otherwise.
22 Weights are normalized so that their sum equals unity for each i for all weight matrices. This assumes
that spatial interactions are homogeneous: each neighbor has the same impact on the province.
15Lastly, we introduce speci￿c control variables commonly used in the relevant empirical
literature to avoid exogenous correlation in omitted provinces characteristics or shocks to
local ￿scal policy which may generate spatial error dependence and provide false evidence of
strategic interaction,
Git = ￿Git￿1 +￿Ajt +￿1Pit +￿2Grit +￿3Uit +￿4Oit +￿5Fit +￿6Cit +￿7Tt +￿i +"it; (9)
where Pit is the population density of province i in year t, which captures the possibility
of economies of scale in public spending and may be spatially distributed,23 Grit is the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate in province i in year t; which controls for
common shocks spatially correlated, Uit is the fraction of urban population in the total
population of provinces, knowing that urbanization is spatially distributed and may increase
public spending needs in particular in terms of infrastructures (Guillaumont Jeanneney and
Hua, 2001 and Rodrik, 1998), Oit is a trade openness measure24 at provincial level which
could have many e⁄ects on public ￿nances,25 as well as Fit, the foreign direct investment
in￿ ow in province i in year t. Tt is a trend variable which captures a common trend for all
provinces.26 We also introduce Cit, the central government transfers for province i in year
t, the centre may want to transfer more resources to increase spending in a speci￿c part of
the country. The central government transfers are introduced as control variable only as a
robustness check, this data reducing our observations number since it is available only from
1995 to 2004.27
In estimating equation 9 we are confronted with important econometric issues (Brueckner,
2003). First, as already mentioned, the omission of explanatory variables that are spatially
dependent may generate spatial dependence in the error term. When spatial error dependence
23 Per capita expenditures and population are in logarithmic terms.
24 We measure the trade openness as a ratio of total foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GDP as it is
most often used in empirical studies.
25 In particular, Rodrik (1998) shows that there is a positive correlation between an economy￿ s exposure to
international trade and the size of its government because government spending plays a risk-reducing role in
economies exposed to a signi￿cant amount of external risk.
26 We cannot introduce time dummies since we use GMM System with external instruments and we have
too many instruments with time dummies. However, introduce a trend is a good way to ascertain that
the potential observed spatial auto-correlation can be attributed to an interaction process and not to a
￿common trend￿ . Indeed, Manski (1993) suggests that ￿scal choices appear to be interdependent not because
jurisdictions behave strategically but because they actually follow a ￿common trend￿that drives ￿scal choices
in the same directions.
27 Data for the central government transfers come from China Financial Yearbook from 1995 to 2004.
16is ignored, estimation can provide false evidence of strategic interactions. To deal with this
problem, one possible approach is to use the maximal likelihood (ML) estimator, taking
into account the error structure or the instrumental variables (IV) method which yields
consistent estimates even with spatial error dependence (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998).28
Saavedra (2000) or Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008) use the robust tests of Anselin, Bera,
Florax, and Yoon (1996) to verify the hypothesis of error independence.29 Secondly, because
of strategic interactions, public expenditure in di⁄erent provinces is jointly determined: if
local governments react to each others￿spending choices, neighbors￿decisions are endogenous
and correlated with the error term "it. In this case, ordinary least squares estimation of the
parameters is inconsistent, requiring alternative estimation methods based on the IV method
or on the ML.30 Under IV approach, a typical procedure is to use the weighted average of
neighbors￿control variables as instruments (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). Lastly, since we
introduce the lagged dependent variable as a right hand side to consider the autoregressive
component of the time series, the previous estimators are inconsistent (Nickell, 1984).
We propose to use the GMM-System estimator in addition to the IV estimator of the spa-
tial coe¢ cient, after verifying the hypothesis of error independence and estimating the static
model with ML estimator. As for the neighbors￿spending decisions, we use the weighted
average of neighbors￿control variables, i.e., their socio-economic characteristics (wijXjt), as
instruments. The GMM estimators allow controlling for both unobserved country-speci￿c ef-
fects and potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables.31 The GMM-System estimator
combines in one system, the regressions in di⁄erence and the regressions in level. Blundell
and Bond (1998) show that this extended GMM estimator is preferable to that of Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) when the dependent variable, the independent variables, or both are
persistent.
28 Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) or Brueckner (1998) use the maximum likelihood approach. Brett and
Pinkse (2000), Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid (1999) and Buettner (2001) are
examples of empirical studies that use the IV approach to estimate spatial coe¢ cients.
29 The use of panel helps to eliminate spatial error dependence which arises through spatial autocorrelation
of omitted variables which are time-invariant.
30 The ML method consists of using a non-linear optimization routine to estimate the spatial coe¢ cient ￿
(Brueckner, 2003).
31 There are conceptual and statistical shortcomings with the ￿rst-di⁄erence GMM estimator as it exacer-
bates the bias due to errors in variables (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). Thus, we use an alternative
system estimator that reduces the potential biases and imprecision associated with the usual di⁄erence esti-
mators (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998) and also greatly reduces the ￿nite sample
bias.
173.3.2 Results
To investigate whether spatial lag or spatial error dependence are the more likely sources
of correlation, we use two robust tests (for spatial lag dependence and for spatial error
dependence) based on the Lagrange Multiplier principle for panel data (Anselin, Le Gallo,
and Jayet, 2006). As shown in the Table 2 (see Appendix A.2.2), spatial tests indicate
the presence of spatial lag dependence for public spending but not the existence of spatial
error dependence for both matrices. As the hypothesis of error independence is veri￿ed,
we estimate equation (9) using ML with speci￿c-e⁄ects for both contiguity and distance
matrices without taking into account the lagged value of our dependent variable (￿ = 0).
The estimation results are shown in Table 2. In these ￿rst estimations, the coe¢ cient of the
weighted average vector of public expenditure in the set of other local governments is always
signi￿cant and positive for both matrices.
We then estimate with GMM-System the dynamic model (equation 9) for both weighting
schemes taking into account the lagged value of our dependent variable (￿ 6= 0). We adopt the
assumption of weak exogeneity of GDP growth rate, trade openness, foreign direct investment
in￿ ow and central government transfers and the assumption of strict exogeneity of other
explanatory variables.32 As noted before, the weighted average vector of per capita public
spending in other provinces is also instrumented by the weighted average of neighbors￿control
variables. We collapse instruments and limit their number since too many instruments leads
to inaccurate estimation of the optimal weight matrix, biased standard errors and, therefore,
incorrect inference in overidenti￿cation tests (see Roodman, 2009).33 Table 3 shows these
estimation results for distance matrix and Table 4 for contiguity matrix (see Appendix A.2.2).
The consistency of GMM-System estimator is given by two speci￿cation tests (Arellano and
Bond, 1991): the Hansen test and the serial correlation of residuals tests. Here, we conclude
that orthogonality conditions are correct and instruments used valid. We introduce the
control variables progressively to check the robustness of our results. We can also note that
32 Population density, trend and urbanization rate.
33 The lags of at least two periods earlier for weak exogenous variables and three periods earlier for en-
dogenous variables are used as instruments. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lags of the
dependent variable from at least two periods earlier.
We use two lags for endogenous and weak exogenous variables. Note that we consider external instruments
as weak exogenous but we use only one lag when the number of instruments exceeds the number of units.
18the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable is always signi￿cant and positive. As this
coe¢ cient provides an estimated ￿ varying between 0.45 and 0.89 signi￿cant at 1% level,
the result indicates persistency of public expenditure and con￿rms the consistency of the
autoregressive speci￿cation.
The coe¢ cient of the weighted average vector of public expenditure in the set of other
provinces is signi￿cant at least at 5% level and positive for both matrices. Moreover, it is
robust and relatively stable with the introduction of the control variables. However, if we
continue to ￿nd evidence of strategic interactions with the placebo matrix, it would cast
doubt on our claim that we have found evidence of public spending interactions. But we
see from Table 4 (last column), that placebo matrix do not show any evidence of positive
strategic interactions. This shows that the phenomenon of ￿scal interactions detected with
geographical matrices is not an artefact of the estimation procedure. So, we can conclude that
there are strategic interactions between Chinese provinces and that public expenditure seem
to be strategic complements: an average public spending increase of 10% in the neighboring
provinces induces an increase of around 5,9% with the distance matrix and 2,8% with the
contiguity matrix in provincial expenditure.34 These results are similar to those obtained in
previous tests carried out in other countries.35
3.3.3 Extension
Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) and Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008) suggested that there
is no reason to assume that patterns of expenditure interdependence are identical for all cat-
egories of public spending. So, we extend our empirical analysis by testing the existence of
horizontal strategic interactions for each category of public spending. Results are provided
in Tables 5 and 6 (see Appendix A.2.3) for distance and contiguity matrices. Regarding
34 As expected, the parameter associated with population is negative and signi￿cant: it indicates the
presence of economies of scale in public spending. We ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant sign for the parameter
associated with the GDP growth rate, which indicates the e⁄ect of economic conjuncture. Results also tend to
show that urbanization actually increases public spending needs. The coe¢ cient associated with the central
government transfers is also positively correlated with the level of public expenditure, as it is generally the
case for trade openness.
35 The empirical evidence for public spending interactions and their strategic complementarity relates to
the United States (Case, Rosen, and Hines, 1993 and Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid, 1999), European countries
(Redoano, 2007), Indonesia (Arze, Martinez-Vasquez, and Puwanti, 2008) or French municipalities (Foucault,
Madies, and Paty, 2008). For empirical evidence of yardstick competition see Ashworth and Heyndels (1997)
for Flemish Belgium, Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) for Italy, Schaltegger and Kuttel (2002) for
Switzerland and Revelli (2006) for the United Kingdom.
19coe¢ cients associated with weighted average vector of public expenditure in neighboring
provinces for the various categories of public spending, interactions seem to be strongest
and most signi￿cant for the category "appropriation for capital construction" and for "ex-
penditure for enterprise innovation." Estimations provide estimated coe¢ cients of 0.35 and
0.24 respectively, signi￿cant at 1% level with the distance matrix. Strategic interactions are
smaller for local social expenditure ("culture, education, science & health care") and results
provide no evidence of interactions for expenditure for supporting agricultural production
and local government administration spending.
Since the principal is the central government rather than local voters, this may explain
that competition is rather on economic than on social performance (education, health, cul-
ture). This may be to answer the requirements of the central government in terms of eco-
nomic performance that the competition mainly concerns infrastructure supply and enter-
prise innovation. Indeed, if local governors are to be evaluated by the central government in
accordance with formal set of performance criteria including social development, economic
items are more numerous. An alternative explanation was provided by Foucault, Madies,
and Paty (2008). They also found a higher coe¢ cient for investment expenditure and argued
that there are spending interactions between neighboring French municipalities for the most
￿visible￿category of expenditure.
3.4 The e⁄ect of the degree of centralization on strategic interactions
As already stated, according to Proposition 1, when the ￿scal system is centralized, local
o¢ cials￿public spending choices are independent of what other agents are doing so that we
do not expect any horizontal strategic interactions. We cannot test this hypothesis directly
since we lack data for the period before decentralization. So we propose to test the e⁄ect
of the degree of centralization on the existence of horizontal strategic interactions. The
horizontal strategic interactions should be lower when the degree of centralization is higher.
To test this, we interact the neighbors￿spending decisions (Ajt) and an indicator of the
20degree of centralization (Cit) and we estimate:
Git = ￿Git￿1+￿0Ajt+￿00(Ajt￿Cit)+￿1Pit+￿2Grit+￿3Nit+￿4Oit+￿5Uit+￿6Tt+￿7Cit+￿i+"it;
(10)
If the centralization actually reduces strategic interactions, we should observe the coe¢ -
cients ￿0 being signi￿cantly positive and ￿00 being signi￿cantly negative. To rely on insights
derived from our theoretical model, ￿scal centralization is de￿ned as transfers from central
government as a percentage of local government revenue.
Table 7 (see Appendix A.2.4) gives the estimation results for both matrices. Our results
tend actually to show that public spending interactions are reduced by ￿scal centralization
(column (1) and (2)). Indeed, central government transfers have reduces competition between
governors: the coe¢ cient associated with the interaction between the neighbors￿spending
decisions (Ajt) and an indicator of centralization (Cit) is signi￿cantly negative while coef-
￿cients associated with (Ajt) and (Cit) are both positive. As a robustness test, we use an
approximation of ￿scal decentralization and evaluate its e⁄ect on the existence of strategic
interactions in columns (3) and (4). Following the relevant literature,36 we choose an usual
approximation of ￿scal decentralization, Decit: local expenditure as a percentage of national
expenditure.37 As expected, on the contrary, public spending interactions are reinforced by
￿scal decentralization. For both matrices, coe¢ cients associated with Ajt and (Ajt ￿ Decit)
are signi￿cantly positive.38
4 Conclusion
There is a divergence between the assumptions of orthodox ￿scal federalism theories and the
institutional realities in China so that these theories cannot explain that ￿scal decentraliza-
tion induced incentives to promote local economic growth in China. Our work ￿lls a gap in
the existing literature by providing an explanation of the existence of competition among
36 In particular, Huther and Shah (1998), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Arikan (2004), Treisman (2000),
Rodr￿guez-Pose and Krłijer (2009) or Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) in their studies of the e⁄ects of
￿scal decentralization on governance, corruption, growth and political institutions.
37 More precisely, we use the ratio of local government￿ s public spending per capita over the total central
government public spending per capita, for each province.
38 Note that we tested the joint signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients.
21Chinese local governments despite the absence of electoral accountability and population
mobility. We show that the central government created a yardstick competition among local
o¢ cials by rewarding or punishing them on the basis of relative performance as voters do in
democratic countries. In this context, information spillovers from neighboring local govern-
ments involve strategic interactions among governors. The empirical analysis validates our
theoretical framework by emphasizing the existence of public spending interactions among
Chinese local governments through the estimation of a spatial lag model for a panel data of
29 provinces from 1980 to 2004.
Generally, a necessary assumption for the existence of interjurisdictional competition is
that local governments are directly elected by the constituents. Moreover, the ￿scal decen-
tralization process has to be total. In China, on the contrary, it is the centralized political
system associated with the decentralized ￿scal system which seems to ensure political ac-
countability of local leaders and leads to competition between local authorities. Indeed, we
formally show that principals can use yardstick competition to increase local agents￿per-
formance whether the principals are local voters or central leaders. Finally, an alternative
explanation for local o¢ cials￿increasing e⁄orts to promote growth is the system￿ s enduring
centralization. We may wonder if control by the citizens is always more e⁄ective than control
from the center.
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A Appendix
A.1 Theoretical framework
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1: Centralized ￿scal system
￿ Strict dominance arguments rule out any equilibrium in which G(Ci;b) = Ci as long
as ￿ < 1
E [V (Ci jCi)] = 0 + ￿(Ci)￿2￿
< E [V (Ci ￿ 2￿jCi)] = 2￿ + ￿(Ci ￿ 2￿)￿2￿
If the central government observes Gi = Ci, it will always believe that the local gov-
ernment is good and reappoints him:
￿(Ci) = 1: (11)
￿ If the central government observes Gi smaller than Ci (Gi = Ci ￿￿ or Gi = Ci ￿2￿),
it will always believe that the local government is bad with probability 1, so, we have:
￿(Ci ￿ ￿) = ￿(Ci ￿ 2￿) = 0: (12)
Hence, we establish by applying strict dominance argument that local governments will
never play Gi = Ci ￿ ￿ since
E [V (Ci ￿ ￿jCi)] = ￿ + ￿(Ci ￿ ￿)￿2￿ = ￿
< E [V (Ci ￿ 2￿jCi)] = 2￿ + ￿(Ci ￿ 2￿)￿2￿ = 2￿:
Indeed, playing Gi = Ci ￿ ￿ gets less rent with no gain in the probability of staying
governor. Hence, a bad local governor will always sets
Gi = Ci ￿ 2￿; (13)
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2: Decentralized ￿scal system without yardstick com-
petition (with pL > 1=2)
￿ First, we show that, by applying strict dominance arguments rule, we are always left
with cases in which G(￿H;b) = G2 or G3 and G(￿M;b) = G3 or G4 and G(￿L;b) = G5
and that ￿(G1) = 1 and ￿(G4) = ￿(G5) = 0:
26￿Strict dominance arguments rule out any equilibrium in which G(￿H;b) = G1;
G(￿M;b) = G2 and G(￿L;b) = G3 as long as ￿ < 1
E [V (G1 j￿H )] = 0 + ￿(G1)￿2￿
< E [V (G3 j￿H )] = 2￿ + ￿(G3)￿2￿
E [V (G2 j￿M )] = 0 + ￿(G2)￿2￿
< E [V (G4 j￿M )] = 2￿ + ￿(G4)￿2￿
E [V (G3 j￿L)] = 0 + ￿(G3)￿2￿
< E [V (G5 j￿L)] = 2￿ + ￿(G5)￿2￿
Hence, the central government will always believe that a local o¢ cial who sets
G1 is good with probability 1. Indeed, the probability that a local government is
good given a choice G1 is





￿(G1) = 1: (14)
￿If, the central government observes G4 or G5, it will always believe that the local
o¢ cial is bad with probability 1, or in other terms
P [g jG4] = P [g jG5] = 0;
and then we have
￿(G4) = ￿(G5) = 0: (15)
Hence, we establish by applying strict dominance argument that local governments
will never play G(￿L;b) = G4 since it gets less rent than playing G5 with no gain
in the probability of reappointment.
E [V (G4 j￿L)] = ￿ + ￿(G4)￿2￿ = ￿
< E [V (G5 j￿L)] = 2￿ + ￿(G5)￿2￿ = 2￿:
A local government will always chooses
G(￿L;b) = G5: (16)
￿ Second, we consider the case where pL > 1=2 and show that Proposition 2 de￿nes a
Perfect Bayesien Equilibrium
￿Using Bayes￿rule, if the central government observes G3, it believes that a local
governor is good with the following probability
P [g jG3] =
￿pL
￿pL + (1 ￿ ￿)(pH + pM)
:
which is higher or equal to ￿ if pL > 1=2, so that the central government is willing
27to reappoint a local government who sets G3, in other terms we have
￿(G3) = 1 (17)
￿Since by assumption ￿ > 1=2; when ￿M a local government never ￿nds it worth-
while to deviate from G3 (￿) to G4 (2￿) given that he will not then be reap-
pointed.
E [V (G4 j￿M )] = 2￿ + ￿(G4)￿2￿ = 2￿
< E [V (G3 j￿M )] = ￿ + ￿(G3)￿2￿ = ￿ + ￿2￿
So we have
G(￿M;b) = G3: (18)
￿When ￿H, it is always worse o⁄ playing G2 since it gets less rent than playing G3
with no gain in the probability of reappointment (whether the central government
reappoint a local government who sets G2 or not).
E [V (G2 j￿H )] = ￿ + ￿(G2)￿2￿
< E [V (G3 j￿H )] = 2￿ + ￿(G3)￿2￿ = 2￿ + ￿2￿:
So, we have
G(￿H;b) = G3: (19)
￿Lastly, under the proposed strategy





￿(G2) = 1 (20)
￿ Third, we show that Proposition 2 de￿nes the unique Perfect Bayesien Equilibrium
when pL > 1=2: After applying strict dominance arguments rule, we are left with cases
in which G(￿H;b) = G2 or G3 and G(￿M;b) = G3 or G4. So, we have three other
strategy pro￿les to consider:
￿G(￿H;b) = G2 and G(￿M;b) = G3: This strategy pro￿le is not rational. A bad
local government will reduce its rent and provide G3 when ￿M only if the central
government is willing to reappoint an o¢ cial who sets G3. Under the proposed
strategy pro￿le, using Bayes￿rule, the central government will actually reappoint
a local government who sets G3 (P [g jG3] =
￿pL
￿pL+(1￿￿)pM > ￿ if pL > 1=2).
However, in this case, when ￿H, a bad local government will play G3 since playing
G2 gets less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment.
￿G(￿H;b) = G3 and G(￿M;b) = G4. This strategy pro￿le cannot be rational given
the belief system and the belief system consistent given the strategy pro￿le. A
bad local government will take a maximal rent and provide G4 when ￿M only if
the central government is not willing to reappoint a local government who sets G3.
But, under the proposed strategy pro￿le, using Bayes￿rule, the central government
will reappoint an o¢ cial who sets G3 (P [g jG3] =
￿pL
￿pL+(1￿￿)pH > ￿ if pL > 1=2).
28￿G(￿H;b) = G2 and G(￿M;b) = G4: Once again, as previously, a bad local gov-
ernment will provide G4 when ￿M only if the central government is not willing
to reappoint a local government who sets G3. But, under the proposed strategy
pro￿le, using Bayes￿rule, the central government will reappoint an o¢ cial who
sets G3 (P [g jG3] =
￿pL
￿pL = 1 > ￿).
The full characterization of the equilibrium is available upon request.
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with yardstick compe-
tition (with pL > 1=2)
Applying strict dominance arguments rule, we are left with cases in which G(￿H;b) = G2
or G3 and G(￿M;b) = G3 or G4 and G(￿L;b) = G5 and we have ￿(G1) = 1 and ￿(G4) =
￿(G5) = 0:
Both local governments are good
￿ Good local governors always play:
G(￿k;g) = t￿k;
So, we have 8
<
:
G(￿H;gjg) = t￿H = G1;
G(￿M;gjg) = t￿M = G2;





Both local governments are bad
￿ We consider the case where pL > 1=2. Using Bayes￿rule, if the central government
observes G3 in both jurisdictions, it believes that a local governor is good with the
following probability
P [g jG3jG3] =
￿2pL
￿2pL + (1 ￿ ￿)2(pH + pM)
:
P [g jG3jG3] > ￿ if pL > 1 ￿ ￿ which is true since ￿ > 1=2. In this case, the central
government is willing to reappoint a local government who sets G3 if it observes G3 in
both jurisdictions
￿(G3jG3) = 1 (22)
￿ Since by assumption ￿ > 1=2; when ￿M a local government does not ￿nd it worthwhile
to raise its rent given that he will not then be reappointed. So we have
G(￿M;bjb) = G3: (23)
￿ When ￿H, playing G2 gets less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment
so that
G(￿H;bjb) = G3: (24)
29￿ Then, under the proposed strategy pro￿le, if the central government observes G2 in
both jurisdictions, it believes that a local governor is good with the following probability





￿(G2 jG2) = 1 (25)
One local government is good and the other is bad
￿ Good local governors always play: G(￿k;g) = t￿k: The bad o¢ cial will be found out
by providing a level of public spending above his neighbor￿ s
￿(t￿k ￿ ri jt￿k) = 0 (26)
￿ Hence, the bad local government will always take the maximal rent when the product
is medium or low:
￿If the central government observes G3 in one jurisdictions and G2 in another, it
knows that the local governor who sets G3 is bad. Now, playing G3 when ￿M gets
less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment so that the bad local
government plays:
G(￿M;bjg) = G4: (27)
￿If the central government observes G2 in one jurisdictions and G1 in another, it
knows that the local governor who sets G2 is bad. Playing G2 when ￿L gets less
rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment. The bad local government
takes the maximal rent:
G(￿L;bjg) = G3: (28)
30A.2 Empirical analysis
A.2.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1: Local and central expenditures
Figure 2: Share of components of local governments
expenditures
31A.2.2 Estimation results - Strategic interactions and complementarity of public
expenditure
Table 2: Estimation results with LM and spatial tests




Spending in j 0.659*** (0.10) 0.462*** (0.02)
Population density -0.278 (0.18) -1.600*** (0.33)
GDP growth rate 0.633*** (0.03) -0.041 (0.06)
Urbanization rate 1.001*** (0.12) 1.559*** (0.25)
Trade openness 0.067*** (0.01) 0.015* (0.01)
FDI in￿ ow 0.960*** (0.13) 1.700 (2.60)
Trend 0.025* (0.01) -0.120*** (0.03)
Log-Likelihood -377.17 -381.12
LMlag (p-value) 12.33 (0.002) 11.02 (0.005)
LMerr (p-value) 1.35 (0.25) 1.25 (0.20)
Robust standard errors are in brackets.***: coe¢ cient signi￿cant at 1 % level, **: at 5 % level, *: at 10 % level.
We use ML-Estimation with speci￿c e⁄ects. The robust Anselin tests for spatial lag dependence and for spatial error
dependence are based on the Lagrange Mutiplier principle and require only the OLS residuals from the non-spatial model.
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